An international framework for the automatic exchange of financial account information between tax authorities, developed by the OECD and modeled partly on FATCA. CRS does for the rest of the world what FATCA does for the US—it enables tax authorities to see accounts held by their citizens and residents in other countries. For anyone using citizenship by investment to restructure their tax planning, CRS is the central constraint. Hiding money offshore through a second passport is no longer viable in most of the developed world.
The OECD developed the Common Reporting Standard beginning in 2014, partly in response to FATCA and partly as recognition that tax authorities globally wanted the same financial transparency. CRS is a multilateral framework for automatic exchange of information (AEOI) rather than a law any single country passes. Participating countries agree to follow the standard and exchange data with each other.
Over 100 jurisdictions now participate in CRS. This includes all EU member states, the UK, Canada, Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong, the Gulf region (including UAE, Saudi Arabia), and the Caribbean nations that participate in citizenship by investment (Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, St. Lucia, and Vanuatu).
The US notably does not participate in CRS. Instead, the US has FATCA as its unilateral mechanism. CRS is reciprocal—countries exchange information with each other. FATCA is unilateral—other countries report to the US, but the US doesn't reciprocate with the same level of reporting on foreign citizens' US accounts (though there are limited exceptions). This asymmetry is intentional and reflects US tax policy priorities.
CRS means that acquiring a second passport in a low-tax jurisdiction no longer allows you to hide accounts from your home country's tax authority. The old offshore banking model—acquire a foreign citizenship, move money to a bank in that country under your new citizenship, and hide it from your home country's tax authority—is dead in most of the developed world.
Here's the practical flow: you're a French tax resident who acquires Grenadian citizenship through citizenship by investment. You move $5 million to a bank in Grenada and open an account in your own name. The Grenadian bank identifies you as a French tax resident (you declare this on the CRS form). The Grenadian bank reports to the Grenadian tax authority that a French resident holds a $5 million account. The Grenadian tax authority then exchanges that information with the French tax authority as part of the annual CRS data exchange. The French tax authority now knows about your $5 million Grenadian bank account. Your goal to hide money has failed.
This is why the era of offshore banking secrecy through second passports is functionally over for people with tax residency in participating CRS jurisdictions.
Over 100 jurisdictions participate in CRS. The list is essentially all developed and developing countries except a handful. The notable absences are the US (which uses FATCA instead), a few Gulf micro-states, some Caribbean jurisdictions, and some developing countries that haven't adopted it.
The US non-participation creates an ironic gap: the US itself functions as something of a tax haven for foreign nationals' accounts. A Chinese citizen, a European national, or a Middle Eastern investor can open a bank account in the US and that account won't be reported to China or Europe under CRS because the US doesn't participate. US banks don't report to foreign tax authorities under CRS.
This asymmetry has created a secondary effect: more foreign money flows into US real estate, US securities, and US bank accounts because those accounts aren't automatically reported to foreign tax authorities. A European might not be able to hide money in Switzerland anymore due to CRS, but they can legally maintain a bank account in New York without it being reported to their home country (unless it's a US source income account or triggers other reporting).
CRS works through self-certification and institutional reporting. When you open a financial account, the institution gives you a CRS form asking for your tax residency, your tax identification number (TIN), and your country of birth. You self-certify this information. The institution then reports annually to its local tax authority.
The reporting includes the account holder's name, address, TIN, date of birth, account number, account balance at the end of the year, and gross receipts from the account (interest, dividends, capital gains). This is comprehensive financial information about each account.
The local tax authority then participates in the annual CRS information exchange. Most countries exchange information with all other CRS participating countries. The data flows through secure channels, and foreign tax authorities receive information about their residents' accounts held elsewhere.
The exchange happens automatically—no request needed, no investigation triggered. It's just the standard annual information exchange. This automation is what makes CRS powerful. There's no friction, no judgment, no opportunity to negotiate. The data flows.
CRS reports based on tax residency, not citizenship. This is a crucial distinction that changes how you plan.
You can be a Maltese citizen but a German tax resident. CRS doesn't care that you have a Maltese passport. It cares that you're tax resident in Germany. So your Maltese bank account gets reported to Germany, not to Malta. Changing your citizenship doesn't change where your accounts get reported—changing your tax residency does.
This is why legitimate CRS planning focuses on tax residency restructuring. If you're currently a German tax resident and you acquire Maltese citizenship while maintaining German tax residency, nothing changes. Your Maltese bank account still gets reported to Germany.
But if you acquire Maltese citizenship, move to Malta, change your tax residency to Malta, and establish genuine ties there (residence, work, family), then accounts you open in Malta (or elsewhere) get reported to Malta, not Germany. Malta then exchanges that information with other CRS jurisdictions, but the immediate reporting jurisdiction is where you're tax resident.
CRS has gaps, though they're narrow. The US non-participation is the obvious one. Some jurisdictions have weaker CRS enforcement or compliance than others. A small island nation might participate nominally but lack infrastructure to implement robust reporting.
Some wealthy individuals attempt to exploit residency ambiguity. If you claim tax residency in a jurisdiction with weak CRS enforcement or non-participation, your accounts elsewhere might not get reported back to your home country. But this requires genuine tax residency status—not just a claim, but actual residency with ties to that location. The tax authorities and banks in participating jurisdictions have become sophisticated at detecting tax residency shopping (claiming residency in low-enforcement jurisdictions while maintaining actual residency elsewhere).
Enforcement also varies. CRS participation doesn't guarantee rigorous enforcement of CRS reporting. A country might be a CRS participant but have weak institutional capacity to actually implement the reporting. Smaller banks in developing countries might not have the compliance infrastructure to properly report under CRS.
But for the vast majority of CBI clients from Europe, Asia, and the Middle East with accounts in major financial centers, CRS means full financial transparency to their home country's tax authority. It's not a loophole framework—it's designed explicitly to close loopholes.
Smart CBI planning accounts for CRS and works within it rather than trying to circumvent it.
The legitimate approach is to restructure tax residency. If you're a Portuguese national with substantial non-Portuguese-source income, you might have been tax resident in Portugal under Portuguese rules. CRS would then have your accounts reported to Portugal. But if you acquire citizenship in the UAE (which participates in CRS but has no income tax), move genuine tax residency to the UAE, and establish real ties there, your accounts get reported to the UAE instead.
Since the UAE has no income tax, CRS reporting to the UAE has no tax consequence. You've legally restructured where your accounts get reported by changing where you're actually tax resident. Your home country (Portugal) no longer receives automatic reports about those accounts because you're no longer tax resident there.
This isn't evasion—it's restructuring. You've changed your actual tax residency in a jurisdiction with no income tax. The CRS framework contemplates this and doesn't prevent it. What you can't do is claim to be UAE tax resident while maintaining actual tax residency in Portugal. The banks and tax authorities have gotten too sophisticated to accept that fiction.
Penalties for non-compliance with CRS vary by jurisdiction. The UK can impose penalties up to £3,000 per account for inaccurate self-certification. Most EU countries treat CRS reporting failures as tax evasion or fraud, with penalties ranging from 20% to 50% of unreported income.
The Australian Tax Office (ATO) takes CRS compliance seriously and actively cross-references CRS-reported accounts with tax filed. If the ATO sees an account reported under CRS that wasn't disclosed in your tax return, it's treated as evasion.
The regulatory pressure on financial institutions to comply with CRS is intense. Banks that fail to report face penalties, reputational damage, and regulatory action. No bank wants to be found in violation of CRS—the compliance cost and the reputational damage are substantial.
For individuals, the consequence is that you can't realistically hide accounts from your tax authority in a CRS participating jurisdiction. The infrastructure is too developed, the enforcement is too active, and the penalties are too severe.
A typical CRS planning scenario: you're a German national earning substantial non-German-source income. You want to restructure to minimize taxation. Rather than acquiring a second citizenship and hoping to hide accounts (which CRS prevents), you acquire second citizenship in the UAE, move genuine tax residency there, and establish real ties (residency, work, family).
Your income is then taxed in the UAE at the income tax rate that applies to your residency status (often zero for UAE residents with non-UAE-source income). CRS still reports your accounts, but they're reported to the UAE, which has no income tax consequence. German authorities no longer receive automatic reports because you're no longer German tax resident.
This is legal, straightforward, and contemplated within the CRS framework. It's not evasion—it's legitimate tax planning within the CRS structure.
The alternative—trying to hide accounts by claiming tax residency in a non-participating jurisdiction or a jurisdiction with weak enforcement—carries too much risk. Tax authorities have gotten better at detecting tax residency fraud. The compliance penalty is severe if you're caught.
CRS has essentially ended the idea that a second passport can provide tax privacy. It provides residency options, visa-free travel, and alternative legal jurisdiction. But for accounts and taxation, the second passport must be coupled with genuine tax residency restructuring to achieve tax planning benefits.